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Managing the evolution of a dynamic virtual organisation (VO) is a 
considerable challenge, particularly in ensuring that participating agents 
provide sufficient access to resources in order to achieve the overall goals 
without compromising their own information management principles. We 
propose a tool-supported approach, based on executable formal models, that 
supports rapid visualised feedback on design alternatives for access control 
policies that arise when a VO evolves. The approach has been prototyped 
using an established formal method and toolkit.  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Virtual organisations (VOs) develop around needs and market opportunities, and 
evolve or are disbanded as these needs and opportunities evolve or disappear. This 
capacity to create business-focused networks rapidly offers many benefits, but there 
are inherent risks. Today’s collaborator may become tomorrow’s competitor; or two 
firms may simultaneously collaborate on one product and compete on another. As 
collaborators they will share certain information and resources; as competitors there 
will be much that cannot be shared. The maintenance of sound access control 
policies during the evolution of dynamic coalitions is therefore a challenging aspect 
of VO technology.  At each evolution step, each member must trade off the risks and 
benefits of changing policies. Our work aims to make evolutionary steps as 
dependable as possible by providing tools to help in assessing this trade-off.  
We first outline our model-based approach to supporting decision-making during 
VO evolution (Section 2). The key models that we use, of access control and VO 
structure, are introduced (Section 3) and their visualisation via a user interface is 
discussed in Section 4. On the basis of proof-of-concept work so far, we derive 
conclusions and suggest further work in Section 5.  
 
 
2.  DECISION-MAKING DURING EVOLUTION  
 
Virtual organisations contain elements that are explicitly designed (e.g., members’ 
access control (AC) policies, communications infrastructure and protocols) but also 
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significant elements that evolve autonomously and often unpredictably (e.g., the 
membership itself, the VO goals and the resources required to achieve them). In the 
face of an evolutionary change, a VO participant must decide how to adapt its 
designed elements, and in particular its AC policy.  This will typically take place as 
part of a negotiation between participants.  
Our work aims to give participants a facility for experimenting with the 
consequences of alternative adaptations of AC policies. A participant’s policy must 
satisfy requirements imposed by the VO in order to achieve its goal as well as the 
participant’s own information security policy that restricts the rights that may be 
given to other participants. We thus imagine the typical user of our technology to be 
an engineer who must balance these requirements and define an AC policy that is to 
be implemented in the participant organisation’s own systems. 
Our approach uses formal modelling languages that support the construction of 
abstract system models. The formality of their mathematical semantics permits a 
high degree of rigour and automation in analysing the properties of models. We use 
formal modelling in a pragmatic way to allow the evaluation of design alternatives 
when responding to change in a VO1. In particular we provide executable formal 
models of access control and VO structure that the engineer can tailor to the policies 
and characteristics of a particular VO and participant. We refer to the facility for 
constructing and evaluating these models as a “VO Workbench”.  
When an evolution step occurs (e.g., a new member joins the VO), the access 
requirements on each participant change. These changed requirements can be 
derived from a workflow if one is available (Bryans et al., 2007) or from event 
information gathered from observation of the VO. They can be given a formal 
representation in the access control model for that member. The member must then 
ask “Will adding these new privileges to my existing access control policy violate 
my information security policy?” There are many ways of answering this. However, 
in accordance with our pragmatic approach, we propose testing of the (executable) 
formal models. The tests used will be a set of access requests together with the 
expected responses, derived from the member’s information security policy. If the 
formal model passes all the tests then the proposed policy update can be taken 
forward. Otherwise, any failures are presented to the decision maker to form the 
basis of further negotiations with other participants.  
In order to provide a VO workbench to support this process, we require: 
executable models of access control and VO structure (Section 3) and a facility for 
supporting test-based interaction between the design engineer and the model 
(Section 4). The workbench should allow the designer to access and evaluate the 
model without necessarily knowing the details of the formal modelling language.  
 
 
3.  MODELS: ACCESS CONTROL AND VO STRUCTURE 
 
Our modelling language is VDM++ (Fitzgerald et al., 2005), an object-oriented 
extension of the ISO Standard Vienna Development Method Specification Language 
                                                          
1 we are not advocating the use of formal methods to produce a formally verified system design; here we 
focus on the use of formal techniques to help assess the consequences of design decisions that are 
ultimately implemented by participants using existing development technologies.  
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from which it derives its formal semantics. It benefits from tool support 
(www.vdmportal.org) and has a strong record of industrial application, especially by 
organisations that are not formal methods specialists (Fitzgerald and Larsen, 2006).  
 
3.1 VDM++ Model of Access Control in XACML 
 
Our access control model describes the XACML language described informally in 
the OASIS standard (OASIS 2005). In common with most AC languages, policies 
are built on: subjects, including include individuals, machines and processes;  
resources including machines, databases and files; and actions such as creation, 
accessing, and modifying. A request is a (subject, resource, action) triple formed 
when a subject attempts to perform an action on a resource.  A request is submitted 
to a policy which defines a permit/deny response.  
Fig. 1 shows the XACML policy structure expressed formally in VDM++. The 
top-level PolicySet has three fields.  The target defines the subjects, 
resources and actions relevant to the PolicySet.  The components field 
contains Policies (containing rules) and PolicySets.  The  policy combining 
algorithm policyCombAlg details how the results of applying a request to each of 
the sub-policies or rules should be combined. Rules are context-sensitive: they 
contain a condition expression (cond), which may refer to elements of the 
environment (e.g., clocks or history variables). Conditions are evaluated each time 
the rule is applied: if they evaluate true, the result of applying the rule is the rule 
effect (permit or deny); if false, the rule is not applicable to the request. 
The Evaluate operation describes the behaviour of the policy. It may return 
permit or deny, or not applicable (if the policy is irrelevant to the request) 
or indeterminate (if, for example, a condition in the policy cannot be 
evaluated). For reasons of space we do not give the implementation details here, but 
a full description of the VDM++ model is in (Bryans and Fitzgerald, 2007). 
 
  PolicySet :: target : [Target] 
               components : set of (Policy|PolicySet) 
               policyCombAlg : CombAlg; 
 
  Target :: subjects : set of Subject 
            resources : set of Resource 
            actions : set of Action; 
  
  Policy :: target : [Target] 
            rules : set of Rule 
            ruleCombAlg : CombAlg; 
  
  CombAlg = <denyOverrides> | <permitOverrides>; 
  
  Rule :: target : [Target]   
          effect : Effect 
          cond : [Cond] 
 
  operations 
 
  Evaluate(pol:PolicySet,from,to:Aid,res:Resource;act:Action) : Result 
 
Figure 1 – VDM++ description of an access control policy structure. 
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3.2 Virtual Organisation Structural Model 
We take a bottom-up approach to modelling a Virtual Organisation, focusing on 
information and the access control rules governing information flow. Consider our 
model of a Virtual Breeding Enviroment (VBE) (Sanchez et al., 2005). Fig. 2 shows 
an example VBE composed of agents that may be members of VOs. The VBE maps 
VO identifiers (VOid) to VOs and agent identifiers (Aid) to agents in the 
environment. The agent’s acpolicy governs access to its own information 
resources. Operations to describe agents joining and leaving coalitions, as well as for 
information transfer, are also included.   This approach to modelling VOs, together 
its application to VOs in the chemical industry, is presented in (Bryans et al., 2006). 
 
  VBE :: VOset : map VOid to VO 
         agents : map Aid to Agent 
 
  VO :: members : set of Aid 
         
  Agent :: resources : set of Resource 
           acpolicy : PolicySet  
   
Figure 2 –VDM++ description of a virtual breeding environment.  
 
 
4.  MODEL ANALYSIS THROUGH VISUALISATION 
 
Our proposed VO workbench has the model-view-control style of architecture 
outlined in Fig. 3. The formal models are executable and can be run on an interpreter 
within the VDMTools tool set. The VDMTools Application Programmer Interface 
(API) allows interface code to be written allowing a graphical user interface (GUI) 
for the human user. Test scenarios can also be presented as “scripts” that can govern 
user interaction if required. The script is executed through a handler and interacts 
with the user through the GUI. Events in the GUI (e.g. to make an access request for 
information from a resource, or to modify the membership of a VO) are translated 
into calls to the interpreter via the API.  The results of tests and script runs can be 
presented back to the user through the GUI.  
 
Figure 3 – Outline architecture of the VO Workbench. 
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5.  CURRENT STATUS & FURTHER WORK 
 
We have built and validated models of XACML and several VO structures. We have 
also constructed a proof-of-concept VO workbench using the architecture shown in 
Fig. 3 and incorporating the VO structural model – we plan to extend this with the 
AC model. Case studies with users suggest that there is great value in providing an 
interface that allows users to experiment with the consequences of alternative policy 
priorities. It also provides a basis for analysing mismatches between users’ 
expectations of information flow with the consequences of the model. The models 
themselves are very extensible, and, again in response to user suggestions, we intend 
to explore the addition of dynamic and modal policy descriptions.  
From the engineering perspective, the opportunity exists to perform automated 
analyses (model checking and proof) of policies to determine if invariant properties 
are respected by specified policies (at least, in the model). Our users have also 
suggested a need to describe dynamic policies that can be changed within the 
execution of the model. This latter option will require exposing more of the access 
control model through the GUI.  
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